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Introduction

Background

Conclusions

Recent developments in both Iraq and Afghanistan serve
to exemplify the extent to which Western recalcitrance in
the area of grand strategy has robbed asymmetric
warfare of its strategic salience in the current century1.
While a primary theoretical pillar of the War on Terror
has been the institutional endeavour to introduce an
unprecedented level of operational fluidity to
warfighting through which national interest can be
telegraphed to geographically distant battlefields with
sociopolitical expediency, the tendency of Western
security establishments to overburden narrative and
informational frameworks in practice has only served to
compound the incumbency advantage inherent to the
lesser axes in terms of both material means and
operational kineticism in asymmetric conflicts2,3. This
has thrusted the grand strategic projects which have
served to underpin the operational alignments of Western
security establishments since the end of the Second
World War into an era of intellectual flux. Namely, the
extent to which hybridized tactics such as
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism have been
practically stunted by the strategic overburden of liberal
hegemony is especially relevant as the West sets out to
recalibrate its standards of success for warfighting in the
21st century.

This paper will examine observable disparities in
strategic rigidity between great and middle powers in
their efforts to temper comprehensive counterinsurgent
and counterterrorist programmes with the strategic
calculus necessary to derive realistic win conditions
from an extant lineage of interstate hostilities4,5. Put
simply, the following will establish both the essentiality
of, and failure to, draft high level strategic frameworks
within the confines of practical necessity as opposed to
domestic political aspiration on the part of Western
hegemonic interests. Strategic fluidity, where it exists in
American led counterinsurgent efforts, has been confined
in scope by failed efforts to export Western sociological
features to distant battlefields under the auspices of
nation building6. In contrast, middle/regional powers in
heightened threat environments such as Israel have
demonstrated the extent to which devolution from grand
strategy in order to elevate practical military objectives
to the leading boundary of operational planning has paid
dividends against asymmetric enemies7. Thus, this paper
advances a thesis of success in adaptability at the
expense of traditionally overburdened grand strategic
foundations in the context of modern Western strategic
frameworks.

The relative inability of Western security and
intelligence establishments to overcome the incumbency
advantage inherent to the lesser axes of asymmetric
conflicts has ushered in an era of opportunity in
redefinition insofar as the tenability of purely
aspirational currents in the field of grand strategy is
eroding. Subsequently, this paper concludes the
essentiality of crafting grand strategy in line with
popular perceptions of threat environments and thus the
strategic congruity inherent to devolution of grand
strategy to the level of frontline necessity8. As relevant
policymakers confront the task of reconfiguring the
Western approach to asymmetric warfighting, so too do
the corresponding security establishments face the
opportunity of closing the conceptual distance between
insurgent threat environments and their civilian
constituencies and discerning emerging means of
strategic agility in the process.
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